Search
Enlarge Text | Printable Version | Sitemap | Contact us
People
Upcoming Events
Title: Ms. Job Title: Research Student Tel: 5142 Fax: 01392 263305 Email: sw268@exeter.ac.uk Building: Byrne House Room Number:
I obtained a BA in Philosophy and African-American Studies, from the University of Notre Dame in 2003, where I was involved in a number of projects concerned with issues of global poverty and race. I participated in a restorative effort, rebuilding wells with the Department of Engineering, to facilitate water distribution in Cap-Hatien, Haiti. Other projects included a field course study in Oahu, Hawaii, examining implications of post-911 terrorism law enforcement as it affected the rights of Native Hawaiian people, as well as a collaborative effort with Dismas House of Michiana to facilitate former offenders in successful re-entry into society. After completing my BA I spent two years in social work, first as the director of Kids Corporation II, a non-profit organization based in Newark, New Jersey, and then as a case manager for victims of domestic violence at the YWCA.
I returned to Notre Dame in 2006 to undertake a course in Neuroscience, after which I came to the University of Exeter to complete an MA in Critical and Philosophical Studies of Biology. My MA thesis advanced notions from philosophical hermeneutics to make sense of the ways in which organisms interpret genomic and environmental influences during the course of ontogeny.
Under the supervision of Professor Lenny Moss and Professor John Dupré, my current research, funded by the ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society, examines what, if anything, marks addictive behavior as distinct from other regular behavioral routines. Drawing from a German philosophical anthropological perspective, I suggest that humans are essentially underdetermined, exhibiting an exaggerated degree of plasticity. Such flexible creatures must, in order to construct for themselves a more defined, manageable existence, engage in behaviors which constrain this inherent flexibility. Currently there seems to be a tendency to distinguish addiction from other routine behaviors by labeling it as problematic or even pathological. It would be plausible to speak of addiction in this way if it imposed a reduction in plasticity that was extreme in comparison to most other behaviors, posing troublesome consequences for human life. In other words, to speak about addiction as something to be distinguished from the array of other constraining behaviors—as pathological or problematic—would require some sort of demarcation criteria that gives one reason to do so.
Biological plasticity at extreme levels, in addition to requiring the imposition of behavioral constraints, also purportedly fosters the evolution of increasingly social beings. The claim is that exaggerated plasticity allows for a level of permeability conducive to sociality (Moss). Using this as a point of departure, I examine current trends in the neuroscience of addiction in order to assess whether addiction restricts neuroplasticity to the extent that the capacity for sociality in humans is dramatically reduced, having a multitude of negative consequences that compromise health. Deeming the conceptualization “bio-social” is to underscore the relationship between biological plasticity and sociality in humans.
I propose that plasticity may provide a useful scale, not only for conceptualizing addiction, but for assessing the implications that a wide range of behaviors and substances (psychiatric medications, for example) have for human life. This can be accomplished by observing the degree to which such behaviors and/or substances reduce or foster plasticity, and how these changes influence sociality and well-being.
back
|
Printable Version |
Sitemap |
Contact us
